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ARTICLES
All That Glitters: Foreign Investment in
Mining Trumps the Environment
in the Philippines
ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, the mining industry in the Philippines has
once again ignited controversy over its social, economic, and envi-
ronmental impacts. The Supreme Court of the Philippines, after
issuing a decision in early 20041 that restricted the involvement of
foreign capital in mining operations, spectacularly reversed itself
in a subsequent review of the same case.2 In the process, the
Court fell in with the government's pro-mining stance, a position
deemed critical to attracting foreign investment and saving the
country's faltering economy. As analyzed here, the case speaks
volumes not only of the inherent tensions between the environ-
ment and development in the Philippines, but also of the Court's
deference to the executive in times of perceived economic peril.
In addition, the case bodes ill for the environment and for af-
fected local communities when the business of extracting natural
resources is pitted against the need to attract foreign investment.
Here, it appears that foreign investment (or more precisely, the
spectre of losing it) has become a powerful tool to legitimize reve-
* Associate Professor, Asia Pacific Centre for Environmental Law (APCEL),
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore (alantan@nus.edu.sg). The law and
developments are stated as of July 2005. I am grateful for the comments of several
Filipino lawyer friends who know their country infinitely better than I do. All errors
and omissions remain mine.
1. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Ass'n v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 421 S.C.R.A. 148.
(Jan. 27, 2004). (Phil.) [hereinafter La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004)], available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/127882.htm.
2. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Ass'n v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 421 S.C.R.A. 148.
(Dec. 1, 2004). (Phil.) [hereinafter La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004)], available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov.phljurisprudence/2004/dec2004/127882.htm.
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nue-generating activities with destructive impact. The troubling
thing is that this is happening most in those very countries, like
the Philippines, that can least afford the social and environmental
costs arising from such activities. That the financial benefits of
natural resource exploitation are seen to accrue mostly to foreign
commercial interests can only exacerbate the local communities'
sense of alienation and injustice.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE LA BUGAL LITIGATION
In 1997, an organization of indigenous people lodged a peti-
tion before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, the 1995 Mining Act of
the Philippines. 3 The case-La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association
v. Victor 0. Ramos, Secretary, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (La Bugal)4-also challenged the validity of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs)5 enacted pursuant to
the Mining Act, as well as a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) entered into between the Philippine Govern-
ment and a mining company.6
At the crux of the dispute were various provisions in the Min-
ing Act and IRRs, which allegedly placed the mining industry in
the hands of foreign interests. 7 A constitutional issue thus arose
as to whether the Mining Act was inconsistent with provisions in
the 1987 Constitution, which expressly limited the involvement of
3. An Act Instituting a New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Develop-
ment, Utilization, and Conservation, Rep. Act 7942 (1995) (Phil.) [hereinafter Mining
Act of 1995], construed in La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text accompany-
ing n.5.
4. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1.
5. Dep't of Envt'l & Nat. Resources Admin. Order No. 96-40 (Dec. 19, 1996),
available at http://www.mgb.gov.ph/policies/Revised%20IRR/DAO%2096-40.htm, con-
strued in La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text accompanying n.5 (issued
after the 1996 Marcopper accident, see infra note 60, to strengthen the mining indus-
try's environmental and social obligations).
6. Mining Act of 1995, supra note 3, ch. VI (Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement). (The Mining Act of 1995 defines an FTAA as "a contract involving finan-
cial or technical assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources." Id. § 3(r)). The FTAA in question was entered into between the
President and the Western Mining Corporation Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) on March
30, 1995.
7. See, e.g., the following sections of the Mining Act of 1995, supra note 3: § 23
(rights and obligations of exploration permittee), § 33 (eligibility of contractor in an
FTAA), § 35 (terms and conditions for FTAAs), § 39 (conversion of FTAA into a min-
eral production-sharing agreement) and § 56 (issuance of mineral processing permit
to FTAA contractor), construed in La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text ac-
companying nn.39-40.
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foreign corporations in natural resource operations.8 Conse-
quently, the La Bugal case cannot be simply understood as a min-
ing or environmental dispute per se; it was, at its core, a
fundamental challenge alleging that one of the nation's key laws
on natural resource exploitation violated the Constitution's provi-
sions on national patrimony. However, as analyzed below, the
fact that the case took on a constitutional dimension meant that
the Court finally disposed of it on narrow constitutional grounds,
without adequately addressing the underlying ecological and so-
cial repercussions.
The starting point for analysis is the 1987 Philippine Consti-
tution. Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution vests ownership
and control of natural resources in the state.9 As a general rule, it
provides that the state may directly undertake exploration, devel-
opment, and utilization of natural resources; or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations that are at
least 60-percent owned by Filipinos. 10 Hence, there is a 40-per-
cent limit to the involvement of foreign capital. However, Para-
graph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 goes on to provide that the
President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corpora-
tions involving either technical or financial assistance for the
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils.1" This provision formed the
8. CONST. (1987), Art. XII, § 2, (Phil.), construed in La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004),
supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.39-40.
9. CONST. (1987), Art. XII, § 2, 1, (Phil.).
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or tim-
ber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State .... The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Id.
10. Id. "The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens." Id.
11. Id. 4.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corpo-
rations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
3
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constitutional and legal basis for the FTAAs commonly entered
into between the government and foreign mining companies pur-
suant to the 1995 Mining Act.12
The La Bugal litigation turned on whether such FTAAs effec-
tively handed control over mining and minerals to 100-percent for-
eign-owned companies, thereby violating the Constitution's
restriction on foreign capital. 13 At issue was a particular FTAA
signed in March 1995 between the administration of then-Presi-
dent Fidel Ramos and a company called Western Mining Corpora-
tion Philippines, Inc. (WMCP). 14 WMCP was a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited
of Australia. 15 The WMCP FTAA covered an area of 99,387 hect-
ares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur,
and North Cotabato, all regions in the resource-rich southern is-
land of Mindanao. 16 The La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, a lo-
cal indigenous people's group whose ancestral lands were affected
by the mining operations, commenced a legal challenge to the
FTAA in February 1997.17
In its desire to attract the mining dollar, the Philippine gov-
ernment had introduced a series of pro-mining legislation and pol-
12. See, e.g., Mining Act of 1995, supra note 3, ch. VI. See also id. § 3(r).
13. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text accompanying n.222.
14. The WMCP FTAA had been signed on March 30, 1995 pursuant to Executive
Order 279 (1987), Authorizing the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
to Negotiate and Conclude Joint Venture Co-Production, or Production-Sharing
Agreements for the Exploration, Development and Utilization of Mineral Resources
and Prescribing the Guidelines for Such Agreements and Those Agreements Involv-
ing Technical or Financial Assistance by Foreign-Owned Corporations for Large-Scale
Exploration, Development, and Utilization of Minerals, Exec. Ord. No. 279 (1987)
(Phil.) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 2791, available at http://www.denr.gov.ph/policy/
1987/EO_1987_279.pdf. The Mining Act of 1995 took effect thereafter.
15. By the time the Supreme Court rendered its first decision in January 2004
(La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1), WMCP had become known as Tampakan
Mineral Resource Corporation (TMRC). In fact, WMCP had been sold as early as
January 2001 to Sagittarius Mines, Inc., a company 60-percent owned by Filipino in-
terests and 40-percent owned by Indophil Resources NL of Australia. The original
WMCP FTAA had been duly transferred to Sagittarius, and WMC Resources no
longer had an investment in the Philippines; because there was no longer a question
of foreign control that violated the Constitution, this raised the issue of mootness
during the Court's deliberations. Justice Panganiban, speaking for the majority in
the second ruling of December 2004 (La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004), supra note 2), felt that
FTAAs could be entered into with Filipino companies like Sagittarius, and not just
with foreign companies. At the same time, the WMCP FTAA could be validly trans-
ferred to Sagittarius. Notwithstanding mootness, Justice Panganiban went on to an-
swer the substantive issues raised. See discussion infra accompanying notes 83-91.
16. See La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text accompanying n.34.
17. See La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.30-38.
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icies in the 1990s laying out economic sweeteners for the mining
industry.' 8 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then a senator,
sponsored the passage of the bill that was to become the Mining
Act. 19 Enacted in March 1995, the Mining Act commenced a pro-
foreign investment climate for the mining industry in the form of
liberal economic incentives and political rights for foreign trans-
national corporations. 20 These included 100-percent ownership
and control of more than 81,000 hectares of land for up to fifty
years and generous tax holidays and profit repatriation terms. 21
The FTAA arrangement sanctioned by the Mining Act also
gave foreign companies auxiliary entitlements such as timber,
water, and easement rights.22 At the same time, the Act pre-
scribed environmental and social responsibilities for foreign inves-
tors. Those responsibilities included minimum expenditures for
rehabilitation and community development programs, particu-
larly for affected indigenous communities. 23 Overall, the pro-de-
velopment nature of the Mining Act was clear, given that its
18. See David G. Scalise & Patricia J. de Guzman, Foreign Investment in the Phil-
ippines, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 145 (1995); Van V. Mejia, The Modern
Foreign Investment Laws of the Philippines, 17 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 467 (2003).
For a history of mining in the Philippines and the recent decline of the industry, see
SALVADOR LOPEZ, ISLES OF GOLD: A HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE MINING (Oxford Univ.
Press 1992) (1990).
19. The predecessor of the Mining Act was the Marcos-era Presidential Decree
No. 463, Providing for a Modernized System of Administration and Disposition of
Mineral Lands and to Promote and Encourage the Development and Exploitation
Thereof, Pres. Dec. No. 463 (1974) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/stat-
utes/presdecs/pd1974/pd_463_1974.html. After the 1987 Constitution was promul-
gated (following the ouster of President Marcos), an interim law known as Executive
Order No. 279 of 1987 governed mining for several years before the 1995 Mining Act
was enacted. Exec. Order No. 279, supra note 14, was the basis of the first-generation
FTAAs. See also An Act Creating a People's Small-Scale Mining Program and for
Other Purposes, Rep. Act 7076 (June 27, 1991) (Phil.), available at http://www.
chanrobles.comlrepublicactno7076.htm (a separate act governing small-scale mining).
20. M. V. CABALDA ET AL., INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T AND DEV., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE PHILIPPINE MINERALS INDUSTRY: A BASELINE STUDY (2002), available at
http://www.natural-resources.org/minerals/CD/docs/mmsd/othercountries/
184_cabalda.pdf, Karen Bravo, Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land and the De-
mands of Economic Development: Lessons from the United States and Australia, 30
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 529, 559 (1997).
21. See, e.g., Mining Act of 1995, supra note 3, §§ 3(b), 90, 92, 93, 94; Kalikasan-
People's Network for the Environment, Unjust, Unsustainable Mining Industry, Bu-
LATLAT, Vol. V, No. 2, Feb. 13-19, 2005 [hereinafter Unjust, Unsustainable], http:l!
bulatlat.com/news/5-3/5-3-readerpne.html. (Kalikasan-PNE is an environmental
NGO opposed to the mining industry.).
22. See, e.g., Mining Act of 1995, supra note 3, ch. XII, §§ 72-76.
23. See Mining Act of 1995, supra note 3, chs. X, XI, & § 35(k) (laying out environ-
mental terms and conditions for mining operators).
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promulgation was part of the economic reforms instituted in the
1990s to obtain International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank loans.24 Indeed, the Act formed part of the Ramos Adminis-
tration's wide-ranging program to embrace trade liberalization
and industry deregulation. 25
The 1987 Constitution was enacted after the ouster of Presi-
dent Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Designed to impose checks on the
executive and to prevent future dictatorships, it provided for fea-
tures such as a one-term presidency. 26 Along the way, however,
the constitutional drafters ended up inserting provisions that
amounted to protectionist economic restrictions, including the re-
striction of foreign ownership in natural resource extraction to a
40-percent share.27 However, it appeared that the Mining Act's
provisions on FTAAs, based as they were on the exception in Para-
graph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution, circumvented
the general 40-percent restriction on foreign equity.28 Whether
this was indeed correct as a constitutional matter was not tested
until the La Bugal challenge began. At that point, Australian,
American, and Canadian mining corporations had come to domi-
nate the Philippine mining industry pursuant to the FTAA vehicle
sanctioned by the Mining Act.29
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST DECISION-
LA BUGAL I
Although the La Bugal case was filed as early as 1997, it took
the Supreme Court seven years to render its decision. This hap-
pened in January 2004 when, in a significant (but short-lived) vic-
tory for the petitioners, the Court found that the FTAA provisions
of the Mining Act, and the WMCP FTAA in particular, were un-
constitutional. 30 By a vote of eight to five with one abstention, 31
the Court held that even though both the Act and the WMCP
FTAA used the Constitution's language of "agreements... involv-
24. Bobby Tuazon, High Court Is Courting Disaster, BULATLAT, Vol. IV, No. 44,
Dec. 5-11, 2004, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/4-4414-44-disaster.html.
25. Id.
26. CONST. (1987), Art. VII, § 4, (Phil.).
27. CONST. (1987), Art. XII, § 2, (Phil.).
28. Id. 4.
29. Tuazon, supra note 24.
30. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text following n.37.
31. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, (Carpio-Morales, J.) (Davide, Puno,
Quisumbing, Carpio, Corona, Callejo, & Tinga, JJ., concurring) (Vitug, Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, & Austria-Martinez, JJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 23188
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ing either technical or financial assistance,"32 the FTAA and those
agreements proposed by the Mining Act were, in effect, "service
contracts" that granted beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
over resources that rightly belonged to the Philippines and her cit-
izens. 33 Service contracts, the Court determined, were found in
the earlier 1973 Constitution, but had been omitted from the 1987
Constitution for being antithetical to sovereignty over natural re-
sources in that they allowed foreign control over such resources.34
The Court thus understood such contracts as having been effec-
tively banned by Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.35
In reading the exception in Paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section
2 literally, the Court concluded that any agreement allowing more
than financial and technical assistance or permitting a party to
provide any form of managerial assistance would effectively trans-
fer beneficial ownership of natural resources to a foreign-owned
corporation and would thus breach the Constitution. 36 In the
Court's opinion, the WMCP FTAA in question exceeded the
bounds permitted by the Paragraph 4 exception and would thus
constitute a form of "service contract" that was disallowed.37 In
the process, the Court held several provisions of the Mining Act
and its IRRs to be invalid, including those allowing foreign compa-
nies to hold exploration permits and mineral processing permits. 38
The issue before the Court went to the heart of the fundamen-
tal question regarding the treatment of foreign direct investment
in the Philippines: how to reconcile the rigid protectionist restric-
tions of the 1987 Constitution with the pressing need to attract
more foreign investments and capital in 2004.39 The Court's in-
terpretation clearly placed the Constitution at odds with the gov-
ernment's economic priorities.
32. CONST. (1987), Art. XII, § 2, 4, (Phil.).
33. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text following n.261.
34. Id. at text accompanying n.228. See also infra note 39 and accompanying text.
See generally Merlin M. Magallona, Service Contracts in Philippine Natural Re-
sources, 9 WORLD BULLETIN 1 (1993); Victorio Mario A. Dimagiba, Service Contract
Concepts in Energy, Vol. LVII PHIL. L.J. 307 (1982).
35. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text accompanying n.261.
36. Id. at text accompanying nn.223-28. See also John Tivey & Ben Macdonald,
Constitutional Validity of FTAAs and Philippine Mining Law, ENERGY & RESOURCES
(Freehills, Sydney, Austl.), Apr. 8, 2004 [hereinafter Constitutional Validity], http:l!
www.freehills.com.aulpublications/publications_1187.asp.
37. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.293-99.
38. Id. at text accompanying n.280.
39. See Ruben James Croft, Opinion, Free Foreign Investment from the Past, Ad-
vance the National Interest, THE MANILA TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2004, available at http:/www.
manilatimes.net/national/2004/dec/06/yehey/opinion/20041206opi6.html.
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Apart from the constitutional backdrop, the La Bugal case
must be understood within the context of the government's accel-
erated drive to pump up the economy in general and the ailing
mining industry in particular. Despite the passage of the Mining
Act and its IRRs, foreign investment in the Philippine mining in-
dustry remained lukewarm in the following years. There were
several reasons for this, including the general lack of confidence in
the Philippine economy;40 bureaucratic inefficiency in approving
permits; 41 volatility in world metal markets; 42 opposition by local
communities; 43 and, importantly, the very uncertainty surround-
ing FTAAs and the prospect of their being challenged before the
courts. 4 4
The mining issue had also been complicated by the enactment
of the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, 45 which con-
tained numerous provisions that were inconsistent with the Min-
ing Act. For one thing, the IPRA gives indigenous communities
preferential rights and safeguards over natural resource exploita-
tion in their ancestral domains.46 Given that many potential min-
ing sites are located within ancestral lands, the IPRA became an
immediate obstacle to the mining industry.47
40. See, e.g., Mess in Manila, THE ECONOMIST (LONDON), July 16, 2005, at 72 (de-
tailing the impact of political uncertainty on investor confidence).
41. The Mineral Action Plan, issued in 2004, was precisely meant to fast-track
permit approvals. National Policy Agenda on Revitalizing Mining in the Philippines,
Mineral Action Plan for Exec. Ord. Nos. 270 and 270A [hereinafter MAP], available at
www.mgb.gov.ph/map/map-final.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). See also A State-
ment Calling for the Scrapping of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and the Rejection
of the Mineral Action Plan of the Arroyo Government (Nov. 11, 2004) [hereinafter
Statement], http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press493.htm.
42. See, e.g., Unjust, Unsustainable, supra note 21.
43. See, e.g., Tyrone Velez, Church Leaders, Lumads Gear for Anti-Mining Pro-
tests in Mindanao, BULATLAT, Vol. V, No. 1, Feb. 6-12, 2005, http://www.bulatlat.com/
news/5-1/5-1-mindanao.html; Catherine Coumans, The Successful Struggle Against
Submarine Tailings Disposal in Marinduque, Philippines, MININGWATCH CANADA,
Apr. 2002, http://www.miningwatch.ca/updir/Marinduque-STDStruggle.pdf;
CABALDA ET AL., supra note 20, at 58-60.
44. See, e.g., Croft, supra note 39.
45. An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous People, Creating a National Commission of Indigenous Peo-
ple, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
Other Purposes, Rep. Act 8371 (Oct. 29, 1997) (Phil.) [hereinafter IPRA], available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno8371.htm.
46. Id. ch. III, §§ 4-8. For a comment on IPRA's impact, see THE ECONOMIST, Un-
dermined in the Philippines, Nov. 29, 1997, at 42.
47. The constitutionality of the IPRA was challenged before the Supreme Court,
which affirmed its validity by default; because the Justices were evenly divided even
after redeliberation, the petition was dismissed. Cruz v. Sec'y of Env't & Natural
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss1/6
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To address the problem of declining foreign investments in
mining, then-Senator, now-President Gloria Arroyo issued Execu-
tive Order 270 (E.O. 270) in January 2004, which outlined a na-
tional policy agenda on revitalizing the mining industry.48
Interestingly, E.O. 270 was promulgated just days before the Su-
preme Court issued its ruling. Clearly, the government had hoped
that the Court would fall in line and uphold the validity of the
Mining Act. Pursuant to E.O. 270, a high-level policy document
known as the Mineral Action Plan (MAP) was prepared. 49 The
MAP, swiftly finalized by June 2004, sought to amend the IRRs to
the Mining Act to fast-track procedures for processing mining ap-
plications and issuing the requisite permits. 50 Contrary to Repub-
lic Act 7160, the MAP sought to centralize decision-making and
dilute the authority of local governments over mining issues.51
The government justified its actions on the ground that the coun-
try was facing a severe fiscal crisis and critically needed foreign
Res., G.R. No. 135385 (S.C., Dec. 6, 2000), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.
phljurisprudence/2000/dec2000/135385.htm. Justice Puno wrote in a separate opinion
that ancestral lands did not constitute part of the public domain and that IPRA
merely granted to indigenous peoples certain rights, but not ownership, over natural
resources in their ancestral domains. Hence, the Cruz decision does not preclude the
state or non-indigenous people from undertaking activities within these domains.
However, because the Court was evenly divided on many points, the decision is
largely seen as having cast more uncertainty on the issue. For more information on
the conflict between the IPRA and the Mining Act, see Marissa L. Hughes, Indigenous
Rights in the Philippines: Exploring the Intersection of Cultural Identity, Environ-
ment, and Development, 13 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 3, 14-16 (2000); Patricia Thomp-
son, Human Rights and the Environment: Philippines Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,
1998 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y Y.B. 179 (1998). For more information on indig-
enous peoples in the Philippines and Asia in general, see Benedict Kingsbury, "Indig-
enous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian
Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1998); Michael C. Howard, Mining, Development
and Indigenous Peoples in Southeast Asia, 22 J. Bus. ADMIN. 93 (1994); Jose Mencio
Molintas, The Philippine Indigenous Peoples' Struggle for Land and Life: Challenging
Legal Texts, 21 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 269 (2004).
48. National Policy Agenda on Revitalizing Mining in the Philippines, Exec. Ord.
No. 270 (Jan. 16, 2004) (Phil.) [hereinafter Exec. Ord. No. 270], available at http://
www.mgb.gov.pblpolicieseo270.htm.
49. MAP, supra note 41.
50. Statement, supra note 41.
51. The Local Government Code of 1991, Rep. Act 7160 (1991) (Phil.), available at
http://www.chanrobles.comllocalgovl.htm (the law governing decentralization of
power to local government units). Provincial governments have not uncommonly used
this Code to justify interferences with mining operators, illustrating the uncertainty
in reconciling the Code with the Mining Act. See CABALDA ET AL., supra note 20, at
73-75 (citing the examples of the provinces of Capiz and Mindoro Oriental). Disagree-
ments over the sharing of mining revenue with the central government have also oc-
curred. See id. at 75.
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investment in the mining industry.52 At the same time, the gov-
ernment promised that the MAP would be implemented in a re-
sponsible manner that adhered to the principles of "sustainable
development."53
To buttress its arguments, the government released estimates
of the Philippines' mineral wealth. Government agencies, includ-
ing the Board of Investments and the National Economic Develop-
ment Authority (NEDA), famously estimated the mineral
potential to be in the vicinity of $840 billion.54 President Arroyo
even claimed that this amount would be more than enough to
erase the government's budget deficit and other fiscal woes for
years to come. 55 The government also claimed that new and ex-
panded mining projects would generate millions in tax revenues
and thousands of new jobs. 56
The government's claims as to the economic benefits of min-
ing drew tremendous skepticism, particularly among civic groups
and local communities. From the very start, the Mining Act had
been strongly opposed by a broad coalition of interest groups, in-
cluding environmental organizations, indigenous and farmers as-
sociations, human rights organizations, and church groups. 57
Their claims that the Act was ecologically destructive and repre-
52. See, e.g., Roel Landingin, Macapagal Warns of Philippines Fiscal Crisis, Fi-
NANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 24, 2004, at 1. For a response, see generally CHRISTIAN
AID, BREAKING PROMISES, MAKING PROFITS-MINING IN THE PHILIPPINES, A CHRISTIAN
AID AND PIPLINKS REPORT (2004), http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indeptI412philip-
pines/Philippines report.pdf.
53. See Exec. Ord. No. 270, supra note 48, § 1. For a commentary, see Roderick T.
dela Cruz, Reviving Mining to Get Foreign Capital, THE MANILA TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003,
available at http://www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2003/dec/08/20031208spel.
html.
54. See Cai U. Ordinario, Mining Sector Development to Hike Economic Output,
According to NEDA, THE MANILA TIMES, Aug. 7, 2004, available at http://www.manila
times.net/national/2004/aug/07/yehey/business/20040807bus5.html. Indeed, the ma-
jority judges in the second Supreme Court decision quoted National Economic Devel-
opment Authority (NEDA) Secretary Romulo Neri's $840-billion estimate to justify
their holding. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
55. See Philippines: Mining Act is Unconstitutional, NEWSNOTES (Maryknoll Of-
fice for Global Concerns, Wash., D.C.), May-June 2005, at 5, available at http://www.
maryknollogc.org/newsnotes/may-jun05.pdf.
56. See Dorothy Kosich, Philippines Wants Chinese Mining Investment,
MINEWEB, Aug. 23, 2004, http://www.mineweb.net/sections/junior-mining/342979.
htm (quoting Secretary Neri).
57. Groups that are continuing to oppose the Mining Act include the National
Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), Kalikasan-People's Network for the
Environment, Alliance of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines (known by its Filipino
acronym KAMP), and the Cordillera People's Alliance and Initiatives for Peace in
Mindanao (INPEACE).
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sented a "sell-out" of national patrimony struck a resonant chord
with many ordinary Filipinos, whose instinctive (and protection-
ist) response was to insist on the "Filipino first" policy enshrined
in the Constitution. 58 In fact, such rhetoric even led to radical
calls for the nationalization of the mining industry for the sole
benefit of Filipinos.5 9
At the same time, large-scale mining has long been a sensitive
ecological and social issue in the Philippines, given the history of
serious mining accidents such as the Marinduque Marcopper dis-
aster of 1996.60 Such accidents, coupled with mining companies'
frequent failure to rehabilitate areas ravaged by mining opera-
tions and their conflicts with displaced indigenous communities,
have inflamed widespread opposition to foreign mining. Thus, de-
spite the Mining Act laying down detailed environmental and so-
cial obligations for mining companies, 61 public skepticism has
been overwhelming. This is quite simply due to the mining indus-
try's poor record in fulfilling (and that of the government in en-
forcing) the requisite obligations. 62
Opposition to mining is particularly pronounced because the
major mining operations are conducted by foreign-owned compa-
nies that are seen to be acting only in their own interests. In par-
ticular, these companies are portrayed as being keen to take
58. See, e.g., Press Release, Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama
sa Kalikasan, The Battle is Far From Over (Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter The Battle],
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press522.htm. The "Filipino First" pol-
icy was first instituted by President Carlos Garcia in the 1960s.
59. See, e.g., Unjust, Unsustainable, supra note 21.
60. In March 1996, a huge mine-tailings spill occurred at the Marcopper-Placer
Dome mining operation on the island of Marinduque, discharging toxic tailings into
rivers in the vicinity. The livelihoods of local communities were severely affected as a
result of the incident. It is believed to be the worst industrial pollution disaster in
Philippine history. See generally Coumans, supra note 43.
61. On paper, the environmental and social provisions are comprehensive. Apart
from the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Program and the Rehabilita-
tion/Decommissioning Plan laid out in the Mining Act and its IRRs, various other
laws and DENR Administrative Orders prescribe strict environmental rules for the
industry. In particular, the environmental impact statement (EIS) system laid out by
the DENR's Administrative Order 96-37 (now replaced by DAO 2003-03) prescribes
social acceptability procedures to follow in obtaining project approval. See, e.g.,
CABALDA ET AL., supra note 20, at 20-30.
62. For instances of public opposition to mining, see CABALDA ET AL., supra note
20, at 58-60. On mining and community conflicts, see Robert Weissman, Recent Devel-
opment: "Development" and the Denial of Human Rights in Ramos's Philippines, 7
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 251, 263 (1994). On environmental challenges in the Philippines
in general, see ROBIN BROAD WITH JOHN CAVANAGH, PLUNDERING PARADISE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES (1993).
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advantage of lax labor and environmental standards in the devel-
oping world.63 That these companies had a hand in lobbying for
and crafting the "foreign-friendly" mining policies of the 1990s-
including the controversial Mining Act-further incited public
suspicion.64
On its part, the government's foreign investment justification
for mining drew criticism for ignoring systemic factors contribut-
ing to poverty such as corruption, overpopulation, and misman-
agement. Philippine environmental NGOs cited international
studies 65 showing that resource-abundant countries tend to be ex-
cessively reliant on their export commodities, thereby exposing
them to the vagaries of price fluctuations in the global market. 66
This "curse of natural resources" tends to afflict, in particular,
mineral-intensive economies. 67 The NGOs also pointed to the fact
that the Philippines runs up a "mineral deficit" by exporting the
bulk of its raw minerals overseas while importing large quantities
of metal manufactures such as iron and steel. 68 At the same time,
the NGOs charged that the government had totally ignored the
huge environmental and social costs of mining activities. In such
a climate, the Mining Act of 1995 and the subsequent MAP were
readily portrayed as an outright betrayal of national patrimony to
foreign interests.69
The January 2004 decision of the Supreme Court nullifying
the WMCP FTAA was thus a huge victory for the anti-mining
lobby.70 At the same time, the decision was met with utter dismay
on the part of the government and the investor community at
large. The Arroyo administration was clearly embarrassed by the
ruling, given that it had only just unveiled proposals for the Min-
63. Tuazon, supra note 24.
64. Id.
65. These include the study of developing countries over twenty years by econo-
mists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner showing that countries with higher rates of
natural resource exports had slower rates of per capita growth. JEFFREY D. SACHS &
ANDREW M. WARNER, NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1995,
rev. 1997 & 1999). See also Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources
and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources, 45 EURO. ECON. REV.
827 (2001).
66. SACHS & WARNER, supra note 65.
67. Sachs & Warner, supra note 65, at 837. See also Press Release, Cordillera
Peoples Alliance, CPA Press Statement on the International Mining Investment Con-
ference-February 2-4, 2005, Makati, Metro Manila (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.mines
andcommunities.orgAction/press522.htm.
68. Unjust, Unsustainable, supra note 21.
69. CABALDA ET AL., supra note 20, at 61-62.
70. La Bugal (Jan. 27, 2004), supra at note 1.
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eral Action Plan (MAP) and was aggressively wooing foreign in-
vestors to pump money into the mining industry. On its part, the
mining lobby swiftly warned of the dire effects the decision would
have on investor confidence. Top government officials, including
the President and several congressmen, senators, and department
secretaries, subsequently lent their voices to the chorus urging the
Supreme Court to review its decision. 71 The Secretary of NEDA,
Romulo Neri, was particularly forceful in identifying the huge
losses for the country should foreign mining operations be main-
tained as unconstitutional. 72
Meanwhile, the big transnational oil and mining companies,
no doubt wary over the security of their investments, began to
campaign intensely for the Supreme Court to reverse its decision.
The ruling was feared to have unnerved not only foreign investors
in the metal mining industry, but also the oil and gas and cement
sectors. 73 These sectors also involved foreign-owned companies
operating largely under the same forms of contracts and mineral
processing permits used by the metal mining industry. 74 Over-
night, all these arrangements risked being challenged as well.
The Court's decision would thus have automatically removed any
possibility for foreign investors to own 100 percent of any mining
project under an FTAA, or to hold exploration and processing
permits. 75
IV. LA BUGAL II-THE COURT REVERSES ITSELF
Under Philippine law, a decision of the Supreme Court does
not come into effect until the expiration of a specified time period
for lodging a motion for reconsideration. 76 Given the split decision
in the first ruling and the presence of several powerful dissenting
opinions, the signals for reconsideration appeared strong. And so
71. See, e.g., Aya Fabros, Mine Matters: The Supreme Court and the Mining Deci-
sion Reversal (Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.ipd.phifeatures/2005/MineMatters.html;
Press Release, Kalikasan-People's Network for the Environment, Has Anyone Been
Surprised by the Arroyo Government's Rise to the Most Corrupt List of the World?
(Jan. 28, 2005), http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press522.htm (citing,
inter alia, President Arroyo, Senator Richard Gordon, House Speaker Jose de
Venecia, and NEDA Secretary Romulu Neri as advocates for reversal).
72. Neri requested to testify before the Court during its reconsideration, but his
views were ultimately submitted through a position paper. See La Bugal (Dec. 1,
2004), supra note 2, at text accompanying n.20; see also Fabros, supra note 71.
73. Constitutional Validity, supra note 36.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Phil. R. Civ. P. 52, 56B (1997).
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it was that the government and WMCP swiftly filed a motion, and
the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines (CMP) intervened. 77 In
requesting the motion, the government made it clear that the deci-
sion had grave implications for the country's desire to attract for-
eign investment. 78 In the meantime, a lobby to overturn the
decision was mounted by the Chamber of Mines, together with the
European and American Chambers of Commerce, the govern-
ments of Canada, Australia, and the United States, as well as
moderate labor unions. 79 From the perspective of the anti-mining
camp, a particularly damaging development occurred when Mike
Defensor, the Secretary for the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) (the agency in charge of managing
both environmental and mining issues), publicly aligned himself
with groups calling for the reversal of the January 2004
decision.80
In wielding the spectre of (lost) investment confidence, the
government had sent clear signals to the Supreme Court that its
decision simply could not stand. Even as it was filing its motion
for reconsideration, the government was busy initiating the Min-
eral Action Plan (MAP), the policy document that was meant to
reinvigorate the mining industry.81 Indeed, E.O. 270, which laid
down the legal basis for the MAP, was issued on January 16, 2004,
just eleven days before the Court released its original ruling.8 2 In
leading up to the reconsideration proceedings, another executive
order outlining a pro-mining policy and amending the earlier or-
der was issued in April 2004.83 In the meantime, public consulta-
tions on the MAP were held in April and May 2004; the MAP itself
became endorsed in June 2004; and in September 2004, the Presi-
dent issued a memorandum circular directing all government
agencies to begin implementing the MAP.84
In such a politically driven atmosphere, there was little doubt
that the first Supreme Court decision would be reversed. Indeed,
77. See The Battle, supra note 58.
78. See Fabros, supra note 71.
79. Tuazon, supra note 24.
80. Id.
81. MAP, supra note 41.
82. Exec. Ord. No. 270, supra note 48.
83. Exec. Ord. No. 270A (Apr. 20, 2004) (Phil.) (amending Exec. Ord. No. 270),
available at http://www.mgb.gov.ph/policies-eo270a.htm.
84. Mem. Circular No. 67 from the Office of the President of the Phil. to All Heads
of Dep'ts, Chiefs of Bureaus and Offices/Instrumentalities of the Nat'l and Local
Gov'ts and Others Concerned (Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ops.gov.ph/
records/mcno67.htm.
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the issue had become so politicized that it was being hailed as a
test case for the country's commitment to foreign investment.
With industry groups and all segments of government lining up to
criticize the decision, the pressure on the Supreme Court was im-
mense. The issuance of the MAP, in particular, had presented
what amounted to a fait accompli. On December 1, 2004, the
Court duly issued its decision granting the motion for reconsidera-
tion and reversing its earlier ruling. 5 The decision went ten to
four with one abstention,8 6 with the majority judges famously
opining that "the Constitution should be read in broad life-giving
strokes" and should "not be used to strangulate economic growth
or to serve narrow, parochial interests."87 Thus, in less than a
year, the indigenous people fighting the mining cause had been
reduced to "narrow, parochial interests" holding the nation's eco-
nomic survival hostage!
In upholding the constitutionality of the Mining Act, the
IRRs, and the WMCP FTAA, the Court explicitly endorsed the
government's opening of the mining industry to foreign transna-
tional corporations.88 On the specific issue of whether FTAAs
amounted to service contracts, the majority judges sought to give
a different interpretation than the earlier bench. They felt that
the commissioners who drafted the 1987 Constitution did not ef-
fectively seek to ban such contracts, but instead sought to limit
agreements that went against Filipinos' interests.8 9 Here, the
majority judges agreed that FTAAs were in fact service contracts,
but with safeguards; and that they were saved by Paragraph 4 of
Article XII, Section 2, a provision inserted precisely as an excep-
tion to the 60/40 rule.90 In other words, the WMCP FTAA in ques-
tion fell well within the bounds laid down by Paragraph 4.91
85. La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004), supra note 2.
86. Id. (Panganiban, J.) (Davide, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Garcia,
Puno, Quisumbing, Corona, Tinga, & Chico-Nazario, JJ., concurring) (Ynares-Santi-
ago, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, & Callejo, JJ., dissenting) (Azcuna, J., abstaining). Jus-
tice Panganiban's 246-page majority decision is reportedly the longest in Philippine
Supreme Court history. Five Justices who originally voted against the Mining Act and
its FTAA provisions-Chief Justice Davide and Justices Puno, Quisumbing, Corona
and Tinga-now voted to uphold their legality.
87. La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004), supra note 2, at text accompanying n.5.
88. The Court upheld the FTAA in its entirety save for sections 7.8 and 7.9, which
were held invalid as contrary to public policy and as grossly disadvantageous to the
government. Id. at text accompanying nn.83-91.
89. Id. at text accompanying nn.51-52.
90. Id. at text accompanying n.78.
91. Id. at text accompanying nn.48-49.
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The majority judges further pointed out that the Philippines,
despite its wealth of natural resources, had insufficient capacity
and expertise to conduct extraction operations, and, necessarily,
had to rely on foreign capital. 92 In this regard, the Court added
that the Constitution's drafters knew that agreements with for-
eign companies would entail not mere financial or technical assis-
tance, but substantial foreign investment in and management of
large-scale mining enterprises. 93 In essence, Paragraph 4 could
accommodate agreements that go beyond financial or technical as-
sistance. 94 At the same time, the Court's detailed examination of
the Mining Act and other instruments reveals that the state,
through the President, retains and exercises full control over nat-
ural resources, notwithstanding the involvement of a foreign
party through an FTAA. As such, there is no question of the
state's role being negated or relinquished. It would thus not be
unconstitutional to allow a wide measure of discretion to the Pres-
ident to negotiate FTAAs with foreign interests.
The majority judges' ruling also throws light on the important
issue of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary.
In upholding the legality of foreign control over mining, the Court
singularly felt that it was in no position to second-guess the gov-
ernment in economic decision-making. In this regard, "the Consti-
tution should be construed to grant the President and Congress
sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to at-
tract foreign investment and expertise."95 Very tellingly, the
Court felt that the judiciary should not interfere inordinately in
the exercise of the presidential power of control over the explora-
tion, development, and utilization of natural resources. 96 This
was especially so given that the Constitution gave express roles to
the President and Congress, but not to the judiciary. 97
92. Id. at text accompanying nn.75-77.
93. Id. at text accompanying nn.51-54.
94. Id. at text accompanying n.38. In interpreting the phrase "involving either
technical or financial assistance" in Para. 4, Section 2, Art. XII of the Constitution,
Justice Panganiban emphasized that the word "involving" must connote non-exclusiv-
ity. Id.
95. Id. at text accompanying n.5.
96. Id.
97. Id.; CONST. (1987), Art. XII, (Phil.).
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V. A DAMNING BLOW TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
While such deference to the executive is not unexpected in a
system that subscribes to the separation of powers between the
different branches of government, what is remarkable is the ex-
tent to which the majority judges endorsed the government's argu-
ments on foreign investments. Agreeing that the mining industry
needed to be revitalized, the Court explicitly accepted the govern-
ment's justification in the form of the $840 billion in promised
mineral worth.98 In addition, the Court felt that it must not in-
trude into policy matters and must allow the President and Con-
gress maximum discretion in using the country's resources and in
securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate poverty and
create employment.9 9 The implication is that it is up to the gov-
ernment alone to manage the nation's mineral weath and to bal-
ance the need to jump-start the floundering economy with the
protection of the environment and indigenous communities'
rights. Whatever priority or preference may be given to mining
vis-h-vis other economic or non-economic activities is a question of
policy for the President and Congress, not for the courts.
It is this part of the judgment that is troubling. The Court's
acute allergy to "non-economic" matters such as environmental
and social concerns is baffling. If it is not the Court's duty to safe-
guard these concerns, then whose is it? The Court would have us
believe that it is entirely the executive's prerogative. While it is
right to say that the task of attracting foreign investment belongs
solely to the government, the Court surely possesses the power to
review the legality of the executive's actions, particularly where
such actions impinge on established rights.10 0 This part of the
ruling is tantamount to saying that the issue of balancing develop-
ment with the environment is wholly non-justiciable.
Even more surprisingly, the Court went on to endorse and
praise the government's effort to address the concerns of sustaina-
ble mining operations, citing the Arroyo administration's promul-
gation of E.O. 270 and E.O. 270A "to promote responsible mineral
resources exploration, development and utilization, in order to en-
hance economic growth, in a manner that adheres to the princi-
ples of sustainable development and with due regard for justice
98. La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004), supra note 2, at text accompanying n.100.
99. Id. at text accompanying n.99.
100. CONST. (1987), Art. VIII, (Phil.).
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and equity, sensitivity to the culture of the Filipino people and
respect for Philippine sovereignty."10 1 Here, the Court seemed to-
tally oblivious to the litany of criticisms directed by civic groups
toward the two executive orders for the deprivation, displacement,
and inequities they engender. Moreover, the Court appears confi-
dent that the government alone can guarantee the realization of
responsible extraction, sustainable development, and whatever
other aspirations are contained in the two executive orders. The
Court is effectively saying, If the government says it will be done,
then so it will; see-it's there in the executive orders!
In contrast to some other superior courts in Asia, the Su-
preme Court of the Philippines has consistently upheld the rights
of minority communities. 10 2 Yet, in this instance, it appears to
have abdicated its role as defender. Indeed, the majority judges
did not stop there. While professing sympathy for the petitioners'
cause, the judges concluded their judgment by pronouncing that
"the mineral wealth and natural resources of the country are
meant to benefit not merely a select group of people living in the
areas locally affected by mining activities, but the entire Filipino
nation, present and future, to whom the mineral wealth really be-
longs."10 3 This communitarian message is effectively a signal that
the nation's economy cannot be held hostage to the interests of
communities living around the mine sites. This begs the question,
What about the compelling evidence that mining and other re-
source extraction activities tend to benefit an equally select group
of people-the mining corporations and their political supporters?
Again, while the outcome of the reconsideration is not in itself
surprising (given the political imperative to restore investor confi-
dence), what is startling is the language that the Court employs to
castigate the petititioners as obstacles to the national interest.10 4
The bulk of the majority's judgment was focused on establishing
the constitutional validity of the Mining Act and the FTAA; how-
ever, the precious few paragraphs at the beginning and end of the
judgment that did deal with the rights of the petitioners delivered
101. La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004), supra note 2, at text accompanying n.98 (Justice Pan-
ganiban quoting section 1 of Executive Order 270).
102. Among its progressive cases is Oposa. v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224
SCRA 792. (July 30, 1993). (Phil.), which recognized the right of unborn generations
to a sound environment. For an assessment of this case, see Dante B. Gatmaytan, The
Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa v. Factoran as Pyrrhic Victory, 15 GEO.
INTL ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (2003).
103. La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004), supra note 2, at Epilogue.
104. See id.
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a mortal blow to these affected communities' interests. Indeed,
the only things the petitioners obtained were the Court's full sym-
pathy and a commendation for their efforts to uplift their commu-
nities. From there, the Court would have us believe that to accord
recognition to the rights of tribal communities would be to deny
the rest of the nation its share of the country's wealth. To appreci-
ate the full impact of the judgment, it is necessary to reproduce
the Court's words verbatim:
The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of
the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of
all the people. We fully sympathize with the plight of Petitioner
La Bugal B'laan and other tribal groups, and commend their ef-
forts to uplift their communities. However, we cannot justify
the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along
with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise
legal and binding FTAA contract.
We must never forget that it is not only our less privileged
brethren in tribal and cultural communities who deserve the at-
tention of this Court; rather, all parties concerned-including
the State itself, the contractor (whether Filipino or foreign), and
the vast majority of our citizens-equally deserve the protection
of the law and of this Court. To stress, the benefits to be derived
by the State from mining activities must ultimately serve the
great majority of our fellow citizens. They have as much right
and interest in the proper and well-ordered development and
utilization of the country's mineral resources as the petitioners.
Whether we consider the near term or take the longer view,
we cannot overemphasize the need for an appropriate balancing
of interests and needs-the need to develop our stagnating min-
ing industry and extract what NEDA Secretary Romulo Neri es-
timates is some US$840 billion (approx. PhP47.04 trillion)
worth of mineral wealth lying hidden in the ground, in order to
jumpstart our floundering economy on the one hand, and on the
other, the need to enhance our nationalistic aspirations, protect
our indigenous communities, and prevent irreversible ecological
damage.
Verily, the mineral wealth and natural resources of this
country are meant to benefit not merely a select group of people
living in the areas locally affected by mining activities, but the
entire Filipino nation, present and future, to whom the mineral
wealth really belong. This Court has therefore weighed care-
fully the rights and interests of all concerned, and decided for
the greater good of the greatest number. JUSTICE FOR ALL,
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not just for some; JUSTICE FOR THE PRESENT AND THE
FUTURE, not just for the here and now. 105
Far from seeking a balance between the interests of develop-
ers and affected communities (however difficult this may be), the
Court swung the pendulum in the favour of the pro-mining lobby.
In other words, there was little attempt at reconciliation; the
Court adopted a simple all-or-nothing utilitarian stance, sug-
gesting that those who stand in the path of the collective good
must simply give way. In this regard, the Court's approach is
hardly different from the Constitution's own inflexible and unso-
phisticated treatment of foreign capital-that certain interests
are simply less worthy of protection or promotion. The decision is
totally uncharacteristic of a superior court tasked with the high
ideal of balancing different interests and defending the rights of
the minority.
It is undeniable that the Court came under tremendous pres-
sure to recognize the importance of foreign investments and to de-
fer to the executive in economic matters. 10 6 In the process,
however, the Court glossed over the constitutional proscription
against foreign control of natural resources, itself admittedly
archaic and obstructive to development (more on this below at VI).
It was also telling that the decision came just a month before a
major international mining conference was convened in Manila.
The investor conference had been organized in early February
2005 by the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines with the support
of various government departments with the aim of revitalizing
the international community's interest in the Philippine mining
industry. 10 7 Following the Supreme Court's reversal, the govern-
ment identified twenty-three mining projects for foreign participa-
tion, holding up the potential of millions of dollars in mineral
revenue.' 08 It is expected that the Court's reversal of its earlier
decision now paves the way for the Department of Environment
105. Id. (emphasis by the Court).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72 (detailing the pressure from the ex-
ecutive branch of government).
107. Many NGOs feel that the Supreme Court's decision to overturn its earlier rul-
ing was clearly rushed in time for the Mining Conference in order to send a positive
message to foreign investors. See, e.g., Noel Godinez, IP, Environment, Church
Groups Picket International Mining Confab, BULATLAT, Vol. V, No. 1, Feb. 6-12, 2005,
http://www.bulatlat.com/news/5-1/5-1-mining.html.
108. Tuazon, supra note 24; Velez, supra note 43; Godinez, supra note 107.
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and Natural Resources (DENR) to assess the twenty-three
projects favorably. 10 9
The Court's about-face triggered the dismay and opposition of
civic groups throughout the country, and several NGOs, religious
organizations, and local community groups have vowed to con-
tinue their opposition to foreign mining companies. 110 Mining-af-
fected communities all over the archipelago now fear that the
Court's endorsement of mining will lead to the approval of more
large-scale mining projects."1 In the meantime, the government
has predictably hailed the Court's reversal, with the President
even calling the Court's decision to reverse an "act of statesman-
ship done in the national interest."" 2 In February 2005, the
Court solidified its stance by quashing a further motion for recon-
sideration, this time lodged by La Bugal to persuade the Court to
change its mind."13 In its response to this last-ditch effort to de-
feat the mining lobby, the Court said that no new issues had
arisen for it to reconsider its December 2004 decision."14
VI. HOW THE COURT COULD HAVE DONE IT
To reiterate, what is troubling is not so much the Court's def-
erence to the government in economic matters, but the fashion in
which it summarily dismissed the legitimacy of the petitioners'
claims. In this regard, the decision is an alarming precedent for
all future cases in which affected communities or civic groups at-
tempt to challenge developmental projects that prejudice their
rights, be these mining, logging, industrial, or settlement projects.
In many ways, the Court has restricted its flexibility in deciding
such future cases. Indeed, it will be difficult for the Court to
strike down any project that is claimed to be for the national good,
particularly if foreign investor confidence is invoked.
In retrospect, the Court could have arrived at the same con-
clusion in the La Bugal case, but with a more refined and sophisti-
109. Tuazon, supra note 24.
110. See Velez, supra note 43; Godinez, supra note 107.
111. The Battle, supra note 58.
112. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary to the President, GMA Points
to SC Decision as the Proverbial 'Silver Lining' (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.news.ops.
gov.ph/archives2004/decO2.htm.
113. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Ass'n v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 421 SCRA 148 (Feb.
1, 2005). (Phil.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.phjurisprudence/2005/
feb2005/127882.htm (all the judges maintained their December 2004 positions, in-
cluding the four dissenting judges).
114. Id.
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cated calibration of the interests involved. First, the Court could
have interpreted the Constitution's admittedly archaic provisions
to differentiate between various types of foreign projects. Second,
the Court could have insisted on a more stringent balancing mech-
anism such as environmental impact assessments being properly
conducted as a prerequisite to project approval. Third, there was
no need for the Court to go so far as to malign the indigenous com-
munities by labeling them "parochial interests" that obstruct the
national interest.
On the constitutional matter, the Court's resting on the nar-
row scope of the exception in Paragraph 4 does not wish away the
larger problem with Article XII, Section 2, which is the uniform
and unsophisticated restriction of foreign direct investment to 40
percent of ownership. 115 The Court sought support in the FTAA
exception, but this will only lay the ground for more squabbles in
the future as the government and development interests lobby to
broaden the ambit of the exception. As the hunger for foreign in-
vestment intensifies, it will increasingly seem anomalous for the
government to usher in investments by way of the exception and
yet maintain the fiction of national patrimony. If the Court is cor-
rect in its second ruling that the constitutional framers intended
the exception to extend beyond mere financial and technical assis-
tance, 11 6 then it will have effectively rendered the general prohibi-
tion worthless. Here, the Court could have signaled to the
executive and legislature that the Constitution might be in great
need of an amendment in the light of modern developmental
imperatives.
The blanket restriction on foreign investment also fails to dif-
ferentiate between different types of foreign investors; the projects
they bring in; the relative importance to the economy; and the so-
cial, ecological, and national security impacts.117 A uniform and
rigid restriction can only chill the whole investment climate, as it
has surely done in the Philippines. Even with the Supreme
Court's second ruling, foreign investors will remain wary of consti-
tutional challenges to their projects as long as the Constitution
maintains its hostile tenor. Relying on a tenuous exception does
little to comfort investors.
On the whole, foreign investment regulation must be made
much more flexible by employing a case-by-case examination that
115. CONST. (1987), Art. XII, § 2, (Phil.).
116. La Bugal (Dec. 1, 2004), supra note 2, at text accompanying nn.51-52.
117. See also Croft, supra note 39.
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allows the imposition of specific requirements and conditions (or
even outright rejections) on sensitive projects that may have a
harmful impact on the nation.118 The Supreme Court would have
done well to signal this point. In any event, a rigid adherence to
protectionism and national patrimony is archaic and out of kilter
with a liberalizing, developing economy that depends so much on
foreign investments. Again, the solution to balancing foreign and
local interests is to negotiate and impose conditions, not to impose
blanket restrictions.
By utilizing balancing mechanisms (and this is an extension
of the point made above), conditions can and should rightly be im-
posed to balance the respective interests at play. Here, the Court
could have insisted on the strengthening of means such as the en-
vironmental impact study (EIS) or assessment process, which can
be usefully employed to identify competing demands and to lay
down remedial or alleviating measures. The EIS mechanism is
already well-established in Philippine law. Its procedures are ad-
ministered by the DENR in its assessment of the environmental
and social impact of proposed projects. 119 What the Court dic-
tates, though, is to leave EIS studies and appraisal to the sole dis-
cretion of the executive through the DENR.
The reality, of course, is that EIS procedures can be compro-
mised by the pressure exerted by project proponents, including
foreign investors and government figures themselves. 20 Not un-
commonly, these procedures are either influenced to support a
particular predetermined outcome, or are simply carried out as a
perfunctory exercise that has no bearing on the ultimate outcome.
To be fair, this is a common phenomenon in many other countries.
In any event, EIS/EIA studies can be successful in reconciling
competing demands, but typically only when all parties are will-
ing to accommodate other interests. No doubt foreign investment
118. Id.
119. Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes, Pres. Dec.
No. 1586, § 2 (1978) (Phil.), revised by DENR Administrative Orders No. 96-37, 2000-
05, 2000-37, 2003-03.
120. See, e.g., Coumans, supra note 43 (detailing the manner in which corporate
and political interests can influence EIS approval). For another account of political
interference with the system, see Edward E. Yates, Public Participation in Economic
and Environmental Planning: A Case Study of the Philippines, 22 DENy. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 107, 114-16 (1993). For a specific example of how EIS requirements were
skirted by the developers of a golf course project, see Wilhelmina S. Orozco, Golf
Course is Focus of Antipolo Land Row, THE MANILA TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, available at
http://www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2004/mar/29/20040329spe1.html.
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in mining projects would also be subject to EIS procedures, but the
Court assumes that these will invariably be carried out in an im-
partial and uncontentious fashion by the DENR. This is a highly
unrealistic assumption.
Given the government's fervor for the mining industry to save
the country from economic ruin, there is serious cause to doubt
that a rigorous EIS procedure will ever be imposed on foreign min-
ing projects. This is particularly true because none other than the
DENR Secretary himself has thrown his weight behind the min-
ing cause!121 Civic groups also worry that the Mining Action
Plan's proposal to institute an efficient one-stop-shop process for
approving mining permits will seriously compromise the DENR's
ability to scrutinize the environmental and social records of min-
ing proponents. 122 From a systemic angle, this issue reveals the
inherent tensions in a government agency such as DENR, which
combines both the environmental-scrutiny and natural-resource-
extraction functions. It may be time for these functions to be sep-
arated, thus allowing for a truly independent environmental
agency to assess project proposals without the risk of conflicts of
interest. 123
Meanwhile, the Court's unqualified confidence in the govern-
ment's ability to bring about "sustainable mining"-whatever that
means-is staggering. The reality of the matter is that few devel-
oping countries, not least the Philippines, have a strong track re-
cord in reconciling developmental objectives with environmental
concerns. 124 The real matter the Supreme Court failed to address
is the people's skepticism over the ability of their government to
bring about "sustainable development." As far as the people are
concerned (disregarding the investors for now), the crisis of confi-
121. The DENR Secretary's support for the mining industry is not totally incongru-
ous, if we bear in mind that the DENR takes charge of both the protection of the
environment and the extraction of natural resources. Thus, the Mining and Geosci-
ences Bureau (MGB), the lead agency tasked with the management and promotion of
the mining industry, is constituted within the DENR. See MGB Home Page, http:ll
www.mgb.gov.ph (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
122. Philippines to Be Drilled, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Vol. 26, No. 1-2, Jan.-Feb.
2005, available at http://multinationalmonitor.orgmm2005/012005/front.html.
123. The jury is still out on whether a mega-agency with both environmental and
resource extraction functions is preferable to having separate but possibly uncoordi-
nated/competing agencies. In recent years, the fused approach has been gaining popu-
larity-the Philippines' DENR is the oldest such model in the Southeast Asian region,
with Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia recently joining the fold. For an analysis of
these developments, see Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Environmental Law and Institutions in
Southeast Asia: A Review of Recent Developments, VIII SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 177 (2004).
124. See generally Yates, supra note 120.
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dence is neither in the Constitution nor in the Mining Act, but in
their government's ability to reconcile the environment-versus-de-
velopment debate. This is by no means an easy issue to resolve,
but in disposing of the case in purely constitutional and legal
terms, the Court has missed the underlying social and environ-
mental tensions that permeated the whole litigation. For that
reason alone, the La Bugal result may have satisfied the needs of
the foreign investors and government for now, but it imparts little
long-term stability to the rocky landscape of social and environ-
mental justice. Far from it, the case practically guarantees fur-
ther protracted disputes between displaced communities and
project proponents.
This brings us to the point regarding the affected communi-
ties themselves. Simply put, it is unprogressive and wrong to ex-
pect these peoples to submit to developmental objectives without
seeking to reconcile their interests with those of the project propo-
nents. The Court's ruling pits the good of the general public
against the claims of indigenous communities, and subsumes fun-
damental demands for social justice under the dominant discourse
that necessary and inevitable sacrifices must be made in the name
of national development. 125 It is a simplistic approach that places
the relevant interests at diametrically opposing polarities, with
nary an attempt to reconcile-save for an offer of sympathy. It is
also this kind of discourse that would lead us to believe that natu-
ral resources are a curse, and that their extraction necessarily
leads to benefits for some and social inequity for others. The real-
ity is more sophisticated: It is not natural resources per se that
constitute the curse, but a combination of abundant resources,
dysfunctional institutions, and rent-seeking. 126 Or, in two words,
bad governance. This, the Court ignores.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the La Bugal litigation is a reflection of how the
politically relevant actors have chosen to view reality in simplis-
tic, two-dimensional terms. Just as the legislature, in enacting
the highest law of the land, tars foreign capital as bad, the execu-
tive sees foreign investment in mining as the savior for economic
125. Fabros, supra note 71.
126. See generally Halvo Mehlum, Kalle Moene & Ragnar Torvik, Institutions and
the Resource Curse, in MEMORANDUM FROM DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY
OF OSLO (Int'l Standard Serial No. 0801-1117, 2002), available at http://www.oeko-
nomi.uio.no/memo/memopdf/memo2902.pdf.
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failure; meanwhile, the judiciary views all communities standing
in the way of the collective good as parochial. Along the way, some
forget that some foreign capital can be good, that there are other
more insidious causes of economic failure, and that not all minor-
ity rights constitute tyranny. In this case, while the greater good
of the many appears to have been promoted, the failure to address
the legitimate fears of the few can only promise more systemic
failures in the future. This is not to say that the Court should
have struck down foreign mining; surely the Philippines, like any
other country, needs foreign investment. The problem with La
Bugal is not its result, but the way in which the Court summarily
rejected minority concerns without creating fair and lasting
safeguards. 127
127. As a postscript, Justice Artemio Panganiban has declared out of court that
there has been a "sunshine effect" cast by his decision in La Bugal not only on the
mining sector but the entire economy. "[T]here has been a significant increase in for-
eign investments, a revival of the moribund stock market, a marked improvement in
the peso-dollar exchange rate, and an emergence of a favorable business climate."
Annie A. Laborte, Justice Panganiban Highlights 'Sunshine Effect' of SC Mining
Decision, Supreme Court Public Information Office, May-June 2005, http://pio.
supremecourt.gov.ph/benchmark/05/05-06/05-060546.php (quoting Justice Pangani-
ban's speech at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on April 20, 2005). Meanwhile,
the embattled Gloria Arroyo continues to fend off charges that she rigged the 2004
presidential election. See THE ECONOMIST, The Philippines: Under Fire, July 9, 2005,
at 11. Her relief over the Supreme Court's reversal of La Bugal was also shortlived, as
the Court voted in July 2005 to freeze her administration's expanded sales tax (VAT)
law. The court will later consider the constitutionality of the law. Perhaps there is
hope of invoking the investor confidence argument?
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